

Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
USCINCEUR IMMEDIATE
USNMR SHAPE IMMEDIAE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 141265

EXDIS, MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: MOPS, PINS, EFIN, EAID, FR, CG

SUBJECT:AFRICAN MUTUAL DEFENSE FORCE

EUCOM FOR GENERAL HUYSER AND WALTER SILVA

1. FOLLOWING IS USG-APPROVED POSITION PAPER PREPARED FOR
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2. FRANCE HAS BEEN CONSIDERING FOR SOME TIME THE POSSI-
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AFRICAN MUTUAL DEFENSE FORCE APPEARS TO BE DESIGNED TO PLACE
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DECISIVENESS IN ACTING TO ASSIST MODERATE BLACK AFRICAN
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3. UNTIL SHABA, HOWEVER, FRENCH DISCUSSION OF AN AFRICAN

MUTUAL DEFENSE FORCE HAD BEEN LARGELY CONFINED TO THE FRAMEWORK OF THE WEST AFRICAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY. RESULTS FROM THE FIRST CONFERENCE OF THE CEAO'S NON-AGGRESSION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE PACT LAST NOVEMBER WERE LARGELY INCONCLUSIVE, WITH MOST OF THE SEVEN STATES REPRESENTED FEELING THAT IT WAS TOO SOON TO SPEAK SERIOUSLY ABOUT A COMMON DEFENSE FORCE.

4. SHABA, COINCIDING AS IT DID WITH THE FIFTH FRANCO-AFRICAN SUMMIT, REFUELED INTEREST IN THE FORCE, HOWEVER. WHILE THE SUMMIT AT PARIS THIS MAY AS A WHOLE REACHED NO AGREEMENT ON SECURITY COOPERATION, A NUMBER OF AFRICAN LEADERS PRESENT, INCLUDING HOUPOUET-BOIGNY OF THE IVORY COAST AND BONGO OF GABON, SAID THEY FAVORED EXPANSION OF THE EXISTING (THOUGH NOT VERY ACTIVE) DEFENSE AGREEMENTS TO INCLUDE CERTAIN OTHER AFRICAN STATES.

5.
THE AFRICAN FORCE

THE ELEMENTS OF THE EMERGING MULTINATIONAL AFRICAN FORCE, AS WE CURRENTLY UNDERSTAND IT, INCLUDE:

--TROOPS FROM MOROCCO, SENEGAL, TOGO AND THE CENTRAL
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AFRICAN EMPIRE;

--OTHER LIKELY CANDIDATES TO JOIN ARE GABON, THE IVORY COAST AND MAURITANIA;

--FRANCE HAS ALSO EXPRESSED INTEREST IN HAVING SOME ANGLO-PHONE AFRICAN PARTICIPATION, HAVING IN MIND IN PARTICULAR GHANA, AND POSSIBLY A SYMBOLIC CONTRIBUTION BY LIBERIA;

--FRENCH CONTRIBUTIONS ARE TO INCLUDE TECHNICAL ADVICE, MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND LIMITED FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE FORCE;

--SENEGALESE PRESIDENT SENGHOR WAS ASKED AT THE FRANCO-AFRICAN SUMMIT TO TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE IN PLANS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FORCE, AND WILL BE RAISING THE QUESTION DURING HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON THIS WEEK;

--THERE WILL BE SOME ARAB FINANCING, PRINCIPALLY SAUDI ARABIA, BUT POSSIBLY IRAN, EGYPT, KUWAIT AND ABU DHABI AS WELL;

--THE CONCEPT OF A PERMANENT AFRICAN FORCE FOR EMERGENCY

INTERVENTION IN SITUATIONS SUCH AS SHABA AND POSSIBLY TO

INCLUDE 1500 TO 2000 MEN BASED EITHER AT BOAKE, IVORY

COAST, OR DAKAR, SENEGAL, HAS BEEN TENTATIVELY UNDER DISCUSSION FOR THE LONG TERM. THE EVENTS IN SHABA HAVE PROBABLY ADDED NEW LIFE TO THE DISCUSSION, AND FRANCE WILL USE THESE CIRCUMSTANCES TO PROMOTE THE IDEA ACTIVELY.

6.

BACKGROUND

THE CONCEPT OF AN AFRICAN FORCE IS A LOGICAL OUTGROWTH OF
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FRANCE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH ITS SIXTEEN FORMER COLONIES SINCE INDEPENDENCE AND ITS CURRENT PERCEPTION OF SOVIET AND CUBAN INTENTIONS IN AFRICA. AS A RESULT OF BILATERAL DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS FRANCE HAS RETAINED IN THESE STATES A SIZEABLE MILITARY FORCE AND A SERIES OF MILITARY BASES THAT FACILITATE ITS MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THEIR SECURITY AFFAIRS. INDEED, MANY OF THEM STILL RELY HEAVILY ON FRANCE FOR THEIR DEFENSE AND FOR MILITARY SUPPLIES WHILE IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING THEIR OWN NASCENT ARMED FORCES. EVEN THESE FORCES ARE STILL BEING TRAINED LARGELY BY FRENCH ADVISERS AND IN SOME CASES ARE COMMANDED BY FRENCH OFFICERS. THE PAN-AFRICAN FORCE WOULD THUS ENABLE FRANCE TO PUT ITS BILATERAL MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIVIDUAL FRANCOPHONE AFRICAN STATES ON A LONG-TERM BASIS WITH CONTINENT-WIDE IMPLICATIONS. TO DO THIS REQUIRES OTHER WESTERN CAPITAL INPUTS, AND AFRICAN COLLABORATION.

INCREASED SOVIET AND CUBAN MILITARY AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN THE SUB-SAHARA IN RECENT YEARS HAVE HEIGHTENED FRENCH AS WELL AS AFRICAN CONCERN OVER THE SECURITY OF MANY OF THE FRANCOPHONE COUNTRIES IN THE AREA. THE RESULT HAS BEEN A MORE ACTIVE FRNCH MILITARY ROLE DURING THE PAST YEAR THAN PERHAPS AT ANY TIME SINCE THESE COUNTRIES ACHIEVED INDEPENDENCE IN THE EARLY 1960S. THE FRENCH HAVE INCREASED THEIR MILITARY FORCES, GREATLY ACCELERATED THEIR STILL-LIMITED ARMS ASSISTANCE, EXPANDED THEIR MILITARY BASES, AND EVEN PARTICIPATED IN MILITARY ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS AGAINST INSURGENT FORCES OPPOSING FRIENDLY REGIMES--IN CHAD, MAURITANIA, DJIBOUTI AND, NOW, ZAIRE. THIS ACTIVIST POLICY APPEARS TO HAVE IMPROVED GISCARD'S IMAGE AMONG A NUMBER OF MODERATE LEADERS IN FRANCOPHONE AFRICA WHO HAVE BEEN PRESSING
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FRANCE--AND US-- FOR GREATER MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN THE FACE OF COMMUNIST INROADS.

8.

US POSITION ON THE AFRICAN FORCE

IT IS OUR JUDGMENT THAT SOME SORT OF AUGMENTING, OUTSIDE

DEFENSIVE FORCE WILL BE REQUIRED IF WE ARE TO HAVE ANY REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF STABILIZING THE SECURITY SITUATION IN ZAIRE FOLLOWING THE LATEST KATANGAN ATTACK ON SHABA. THIS APPLIES IN PARTICULAR TO THE ECONOMIC SITUATION WHERE THE EXPATRIATES--ON WHOSE SKILLS THE RESUMPTION OF MINING OPERATIONS DEPENDS--ARE UNLIKELY TO REMAIN (OR OTHERS TO RETURN) WITHOUT A MORE REASONABLE GUARANTEE TO THEIR SECURITY THAN THE ZAIRIAN MILITARY (FAZ) ARE ABLE TO PROVIDE.

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OUR OWN TERMS OF REFERENCE IN DISCUSSING WITH THE FRENCH AND OUR OTHER EUROPEAN ALLIES AT PARIS JUNE 5 ARE LIMITED THEREFORE STRICTLY TO POSSIBLE SUPPORT ACTIONS DESIGNED TO RESTORE SECURITY IN THE IMMEDIATE SHABA SITUATION. EVEN HERE, WITHIN THESE LIMITED PARAMETERS WE WILL WISH TO EMPHASIZE THE SUPPORTIVE NATURE OF OUR ROLE, LEAVING TO AFRICAN STATES PROVISION OF THE ACTUAL FORCE, AND TO THE FRENCH AND POSSIBLY OTHERS THE OVERALL INITIATIVE AND LEADERSHIP.

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WHILE FRENCH INTENTIONS ARE NOT YET ENTIRELY CLEAR, WE DO KNOW THAT THEIR OWN CONCEPT OF AN AFRICAN FORCE EXTENDS BEYOND SHABA. THEY HAVE IN MIND SOMETHING MORE EXTENSIVE, AND MORE PERMANENT. WE WILL RESIST ANY EFFORTS ON THEIR PART TO EXTRACT US COMMITMENTS TO A LARGER CONCEPT THAN A FORCE FOR SHABA. OUR REASONS ARE THE FOLLOWING:

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 141265

EXDIS, FOR AMB. YOUNG FROM UNA

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 141265 ACTION PARIS
USCINCEUR USNMR SHAPE JUN 3

QUOTE C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 141265

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

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